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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
StATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs . 
J.G. CONTOS aka JAMES G. CONTOS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
-h-oooOooo 
Case No. 14521 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant 
to recover as secured party property owned by and in the possession of the 
Defendant, which property was secured by a lawful security agreement executed 
by said Defendant, upon default of the terms of a promissory note concurrently 
signed by the Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge 
presiding, on January 16th, 1976, at the Municipal Building in Ogden, Utah, 
both parties represented by their respective counsel of record. Upon receiving 
competent evidence and testimony, hearing arguments of both counsel, and being 
advised in the premises, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde issued a memorandum 
decision dated 18th day of February, 1976, ordering Judgment for the Defendant, 
no cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant, CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, seeks a reversal of the 
dismissal and asks the above entitled court to amend the case to the lower 
court for necessary discovery and new trial, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, JAMES G. CONTOS, aka J. G. CONTOS, hereinafter referred 
to as CONTOS, a person experienced in the finance business, obtained a loan 
from the plaintiff, CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, and executed a promissory note 
and security agreement. The security agreement was properly filed with the 
Secretary of the State of Utah. CONTOS then filed bankruptcy and a disclaimer 
was granted to the appellant based upon the security agreement and its filing. 
Appellant attempted to pick up the secured property, but was not permitted 
to do so by the respondent, resulting in the necessity of bringing this 
action. CONTOS1 wife did not sign any of the documents, nor is she a party 
to this law suit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE SECURED PROPERTY. 
The respondent, CONTOS, executed the security agreement wherein it 
specifically stated "6. OWNERSHIP - Debtor has or forthwith will acquire 
clear title to the collateral free of all encumbrances and security interests 
other than this agreement." He should not now be entitled to defeat that 
provision regarding ownership by stating that his wife had or has some 
undefined position or interest in the property. 
The Uniform Commercial Code does not require ownership of the collateral 
by the Debtor. The situation where the collateral is not owned by the debtor 
is set forth in UCA 70A-9-112 which states: 
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f,Where collateral is not owned by debtor. - Unless otherwise agreed 
when a secured party knows that collateral is owned by a person who 
is not the debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to receive 
from the secured party any surplus under section 70A-9-502(2) or under 
section 70A-9-504(l), and is not liable for the debt or for any deficiency 
after resale, and he has the same right as the debtor." 
(a) to receive statements under section 70A-9-208; 
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a secured party's proposal 
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness 
under section 70A-9-905; 
(c) to redeem the collateral under section 70A-9-506; 
(d) to obtain injunctive or other relief under section 70A-9-507 
(i); 
and 
(e) to recover losses caused to him under section 70A-9-208(2). 
The appellant is certainly not attempting to obtain a deficiency 
against Mrs. CONTOS. If the Court found that she did have an interest, 
which would be contrary to her husband's quarantee, and contrary to the 
Court's jurisdiction since she has not entered the lawsuit, Ilm certain that 
appellant would comply with the provisions (a) through (e). 
Even if the appellant knew that the wife was the owner, which again 
was contrary to Mr. CONTOS' representations, it is entitled to the property 
though again, not a deficiency. See the comments in Andersons Secured 
Transactions 9-112:4, which states: "Unless otherwise agreed, when the secured 
party knows that the owner of the collateral is not the debtor, such owner is 
not personally liable for the debt or for any deficiency after resale." 
The appellant retains its priority in the secured property. Mrs. CONTOS 
did not and has not filed any documents reflecting that she has any ownership 
interest. The priority of the appellant as set forth in UCA 70A-9-301 is 
still in effect. Even if there is a sale, exchange or other disposition 
of the property, the appellant retains its security interest as provided in 
UCA 70A-9-306(2) which states: 
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"Except where this chapter otherwise provides, a security interest 
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other 
disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized 
by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and 
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections 
received by the debtor.!f 
In 69 Am Jur 2d 458, Secured Transactions, it sets forth: 
"If the agreement does not give the debtor the power of sale, 
the debtor may nevertheless transfer his rights in the collateral. 
However, with certain exceptions, collateral sold by the debtor 
remains subject to a perfected security interest." 
A finding by this Court that respondent is entitled to the secured 
property would effectively change the priorities as established by the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Court. Thus, if the appellantfs 
security agreement is not effective, then the property involved should 
have gone to the Trustee in Bankruptcy for distribution to the creditors of 
the bankrupt. 
If, in fact, Mrs. Contos has an interest in the property and if, the 
respondent, CONTOS, improperly pledged such interest, then she has the 
right to bring wuch claim against him. His representations that she has 
some interest should not be permitted to defeat the plaintifffs claim. 
A finding by this Court that respondent is entitled to the secured 
property will open the door for fraud against secured creditors. Borrowers 
could pledge property, guarantee ownership, then after filing bankruptcy, 
claim it belonged to someone else, and refuse to turn it over to the secured 
creditor. As in this case, by the time it may be determined that the borrower 
may not have a complete interest in the property, it is too late to reopen 
the discharged bandruptcy case. The secured creditor has the further dilemma 
that if the Bankruptcy Court found against the secured creditor, then he loses 
the property. The end result would be that lenders would be required to observe 
all items of collateral and someway through documents of ownership; have tho 
title insured - an impossible burden for all parties. 
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The respondent should not be entitled to benefit by his own fraud. 
A finding by the Court that respondent is entitled to the secured property 
will result in that precise result. 
The respondent received the loan and used the proceeds for the benefit 
of his wife and himself, pledging the furniture which he then claimed he 
owned, but now claims that the wife has some undefinable interest. There 
were no third parties; the husband-wife team should not be permitted to 
retain the loan proceeds and the pledged property. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, appellant respectfully petitions the court 
to reverse the dismissal entered by the lower court and grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this fj6^^ day of August, 1976. 
T..RL T. SftfTH 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f - Appel lant 
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